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ABSTRACT: This article suggests that Aristotle’s Metaphysics culminates not
in the purity of God’s self-thinking, but rather in the contingent principles
found in the Nicomachean Ethics. Drawing on such contemporary thinkers
as Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Theodor Adorno, and Emmanuel
Levinas, the article rethinks the relationship between ethics and ontology by
reinvestigating the relat ionship between Aristotle’s Metaphysics  and
Nicomachean Ethics. It is argued that the ontological conception of praxis
developed in the middle books of  the Metaphysics points already to the
Nicomachean Ethics where a conception of knowledge—phronêsis—is de-
veloped that is capable of addressing the lacuna in the account of ontological
knowledge offered in the Metaphysics.
The suggestion expressed in the title is rather bold and therefore easily mis-
understood. It is not a philological claim asserted in the hope of establishing
the genuine order and progression of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, but a philosophi-
cal suggestion proposed as a possible reading of Aristotle informed by the
contemporary concern to think through the relationship between ethics and
ontology. The philosophical suggestion is that Aristotle’s Metaphysics culmi-
nates not, as many have argued,1 in book XII and the clean purity of God’s
self-thinking, but rather in the far more ambiguous set of contingent prin-
ciples developed in the Nicomachean Ethics. As a suggestion, this thesis does
not aspire to objective verification, but is designed to open new avenues of
investigation into the thinking of Aristotle. As philosophical, the thesis is not
guided primarily by a concern to reconstruct the itinerary originally intended
by Aristotle himself, but rather to locate resources in Aristotle’s thinking that
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lend insight into the deep interconnection between ethics and ontology.2
However, to distinguish between philological claims and philosophical sug-
gestions is not to endorse the legitimacy of any haphazard interpretation,
for we have the inherited texts to hold us accountable. The method of genu-
ine philosophical interpretation can never do more than trace the trajectory
of the thinking expressed in the text which, as inherited, is necessarily re-
fracted through the shattered lens of history.
The very idea that the Metaphysics should culminate in the Nicomachean
Ethics emerges against the background of a number of developments in
contemporary thinking that themselves have been deeply affected by and
embedded in the politico-historical catastrophes of the twentieth century.
First, Martin Heidegger’s treatment of frovnhsi~ in his lectures on Plato’s
Sophist and the more recent recognition by a number of scholars that
Aristotle’s Ethics had a profound influence on the project of fundamental
ontology developed in Sein und Zeit already point to the possibility that the
Nicomachean Ethics may have important ontological implications.3 Second,
Hans-Georg Gadamer’s retrieval of  the hermeneutical significance of
Aristotle’s conception of frovnhsi~ suggests that this ethical concept may
be brought to bear on the ontological problem of the relationship between
the universal and singular that haunts the middle books of Aristotle’s Meta-
physics.4 Third, Theodor Adorno’s critique of  all systems of  identity
implicitly corrodes the aura of authority of those interpretations that at-
tempt to establish the onto-theology developed in Metaphysics book XII as
the natural apex of Aristotle’s thinking.5 Finally, Emmanuel Levinas has
powerfully criticized the underlying tendency that often seems to animate
such interpretations and indeed, Aristotle himself—namely, the desire to
establish systematic order by subsuming all otherness under the authority
of some absolute principle.6 Thus, although Levinas does not thematize it
this way, his bold claim that metaphysics, which for him means ethics, is
prior to ontology, may itself be understood as a sort of invitation to re-read
the history of Western philosophy as something other than a history of
totalizing ontologies, searching all the while for the trace of that ethical
impulse which is eclipsed by the traditional preoccupation with system-
atic totality.
Taking up this invitation with regard to Aristotle entails rethinking the
relationship between the middle books of the Metaphysics and the discus-
sion of pra`xi~ and frovnhsi~ in the Nicomachean Ethics. To begin the
process of such a rethinking, consider the following philosophical sugges-
tion: The dynamic conception of oujsi va  that emerges at the end of
Metaphysics book IX as a response to the universal/singular aporia an-
nounced in book III requires a more sophisticated conception of knowledge
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than Aristotle has at his disposal in the middle books of the Metaphysics.
Specifically, Aristotle’s rigid adherence to the Socratic/Platonic assump-
tion that all knowledge is universal leaves us, by the end of book IX, at a
loss as to how knowledge of oujsiva, there understood dynamically in terms
of ejnevrgeia or pra`xi~, is at all possible. Metaphysics XIII.10, however,
introduces, but leaves tantalizingly underdeveloped, a conception of knowl-
edge that may be suitable to the dynamic conception of oujsiva developed
in book IX. The thematization of oujsiva in terms of pra`xi~, when com-
bined with this new conception of knowledge, leads us to the heart of the
Nicomachean Ethics, and specifically, to the conception of frovnhsi~ devel-
oped there.
In order to trace this possible development in Aristotle, it is necessary
first to rehearse how the universal/singular aporia arises, at least in part,
out of the conflicting ontological and epistemological demands Aristotle
imposes on the principles of his ontology. When seen in relation to the
universal/singular aporia the trajectory of the discussion of sensible oujsiva
in the middle books comes more clearly into focus; for these difficult texts
can be understood as an attempt to develop a dynamic conception of oujsiva
capable of addressing the ontological side of the problem presented by the
aporia. However, once this more dynamic conception of oujsiva is devel-
oped, there remains a significant epistemological problem that does not
find adequate redress in the middle books themselves. In order to locate a
mode of knowledge appropriate for this more dynamic conception of
oujsiva, it is necessary to look beyond the middle books first to Metaphysics
XIII.10, and then, ultimately, to the heart of the Nicomachean Ethics and
Aristotle’s conception of frovnhsi~.
THE UNIVERSAL/SINGULAR APORIA
On the face of it, the universal/singular aporia seems to arise out of the
conflict between two competing interests, the one ontological, the other
epistemological.7 On the ontological level, the identity of each being must
be established by its own peculiar principle in order to secure both its
unicity and its distinction from other beings around it; for otherwise, as
Aristotle says, “Socrates will be many things: Socrates himself, and a man,
and an animal.”8 On the epistemological level, however, if the principles of
beings are singular and not universal, then there will be no possible knowl-
edge of these beings, for knowledge is always universal. Thus, the aporia
seems to arise out of Aristotle’s attempt to establish an ejpisthvmh of be-
ing, for if he gave up on the possibility that such beings are knowable, then
the aporia would seem to dissolve.
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This appearance is in once sense correct, for Aristotle most often for-
mulates the universal/singular aporia as a conflict between the demands of
ontological identity and those of science. However, it is slightly more com-
plicated than this appearance suggests, for even if, as Aristotle never would,
we sequester the epistemological from the ontological concern, the onto-
logical problem would still remain. This is clear from the formulation of
another, related but somewhat distinct aporia, in which Aristotle asks
whether there must exist a principle apart from the singular that accounts
for its being.9 In this aporia concerning the separate existence of principles,
Aristotle begins as would be expected by suggesting that knowledge re-
quires that there is something that exists apart from the singulars, for if
there were no such thing, the singulars would be sensible, but not know-
able, for ejpisthvmh requires a separately existing one according to which
the many are determined.10 However, immediately thereafter, Aristotle leaves
off the epistemological concern and suggests that even on what may be
considered a purely ontological level, it seems that some ungenerated, stable
principle separate from and capable of ontologically grounding the iden-
tity of the plurality of composite individuals must exist if there is to be
anything at all.11 Thus, the aporia of separability, which itself is intimately
intertwined with that of the universal and singular, emerges not only as a
result of the conflict between epistemology and ontology, but also as a prob-
lem inherent to any attempt to account for the ontological identity of beings
that must submit to the process of generation and decay, that is, of those
beings with which Aristotle is primarily concerned in the middle books of
the Metaphysics—finite, contingent composites of form and matter.
It is no surprise, therefore, that as the treatment of sensible oujsiva in
the middle books progresses, the specifically ontological problem of iden-
tity increasingly comes to occupy Aristotle’s thinking and that, by book IX,
something of a solution to the universal/singular aporia with respect to its
ontological dimensions has been suggested. To trace this development as
briefly as possible will be the purpose of the next section, however, it is
necessary first to pause a moment to mention that even if a satisfactory
passage has been found for the ontological problem, a full solution to the
aporia cannot be achieved until the nature of the sort of knowledge suit-
able for this new ontological understanding is clarified. This, however, is
precisely what the middle books lacks, what XIII.10 hints at, and what the
notion of frovnhsi~ in the Nicomachean Ethics supplies. To put the position
suggested here boldly: Already in Aristotle, ethics is first philosophy.
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THE DYNAMIC SOLUTION OF THE MIDDLE BOOKS
To treat the difficult and controversial texts of the middle books in a brief,
succinct and uncontroversial manner is nearly impossible. There have been
numerous book length studies of the middle books, and there seems to be
no end to the controversy over which sorts of beings actually count as pri-
mary oujsivai and whether such beings are to be considered singular or in
some sense universal.12 The concern in what follows is not to provide a
unassailable argument for one position or another, but to adumbrate an
interpretation of Aristotle’s treatment of sensible oujsiva from the perspec-
tive of  the question of ontological grounds raised by the two aporiae
mentioned above.
That these two aporiae are at the core of the problems concerning the
nature of sensible substance is indicated already by the criteria for being
an oujsiva Aristotle sets forth in VII.3, when he argues that to be “sepa-
rable” (to; cwristovn) and a “this” (tovde ti) are thought to belong most
of all to an oujsiva. These two criteria seem to pull oujsiva in two directions
at once; for, as separable, it must not only be capable of independent exist-
ence, but also of accounting for the being of a plurality of singulars; but as
a “this,” it must already be a concrete, demonstratively identifiable indi-
vidual. Thus, one way to understand the trajectory of the middle books is
to regard it as an attempt to find some passage between these two compet-
ing claims.
The bulk of the difficult and often dizzying discussion of oujsiva in book
VII is animated by Aristotle’s attempt and ultimate failure to negotiate such
a safe passage. Once Aristotle recognizes that an account of oujsiva cannot
be given exclusively in terms of form, as he does in the chapters of book
VII leading up to and including 11,13 and that whatever counts as oujsiva
cannot be universal because it must be a “this,” as he does in chapter 13,14
he alters his overall strategy of investigation. At the end of book VII, Aristo-
tle shifts his perspective, no longer formulating the question of oujsiva in
its Socratic form (“What is X?”), but rather, asking the more penetrating
and succinct question, “Why is this matter something,”15 that is, why is this
matter an identifiable individual? This formulation opens up the possibil-
ity for Aristotle to think the identity of oujsiva in terms of the relationship
between form and matter. The problem, however, remains as to how to
understand the nature of this relationship and the terms involved; for as
Aristotle beautifully argues in VII.17, the form does not seem to be an el-
emental part of the being as matter is, but “something different,” which he
labels a “principle,” (ajrchv).16 The question that emerges out of chapter 17
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is precisely how to think the elemental together with this “something dif-
ferent,” that is, how to think oujsiva as the identity of matter and form.
This question informs the peculiar double strategy of books VIII and
IX in which Aristotle first revises and clarifies the criteria for oujsiva intro-
duced in VII.3 and second translates the reified notions of form and matter
into the more dynamic concepts of ejnevrgeia and duvnami~. Taken to-
gether, these two strategic moves allow Aristotle both to circumvent the
universal/singular and separability aporiae and to introduce a dynamic new
conception of ontological identity.
In book VIII.1 Aristotle makes it clear that the terms “tovde ti” and “to;
cwristovn” apply differently to matter, form and the composite: Matter he
calls potentially, but not actually, a “tovde ti”; form, he says, is that which,
“being a tovde ti, is separable in lovgo~”; and the composite, which alone
is generated and destroyed is “separate without qualification.”17 While the
introduction of the equivocal meaning of these terms has been seen by
some as an intellectual “cheat” or “sophistical dodge,”18 and although it
causes considerable complications for those preoccupied with the so-called
“population problem,” 19 it actually marks a profoundly important develop-
ment in Aristotle’s attempt to negotiate a safe passage between the
universal/singular and separability aporiae. For once Aristotle suggests that
form is only separable in notion, and not strictly speaking independent of
the matter in which it inheres, the composite individual is given a sort of
ontological priority and the entire problem of how a separately existing
universal comes to be individuated dissolves. Once the separability crite-
rion is revised in this way, that of the “tovde ti” emerges as the decisive
characteristic of oujsiva.20
Precisely what it means to be a “tovde ti” has been the source of much
debate for many years.21 However, Joseph Owens has powerfully argued that
it emerges in the middle books of the Metaphysics as a technical term de-
signed to designate that which, strictly speaking, is neither universal nor
singular.22 For Owens, who defends the notion that form is primary oujsiva
in Aristotle, the term refers to the substantial form, which, as the ground of
the composite, is itself prior to the distinction between that which is uni-
versal and singular. Yet, as we have seen, the term itself applies most strictly
to the separately existing composite, whereas the form is only called a “tovde
ti” in the derivative sense that it is separable in lovgo~. This suggests the
possibility that the term may be designed to point to the very enigmatic
identity of the concrete composite individual, that being which presents
itself as demonstrably present to, yet incompletely captured by concepts.
As a “tovde ti,” the composite is no longer singular—inaccessible to knowl-
edge and its concepts—but not yet universal—completely captured by the
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concept. Theodor Adorno has suggested that “tovde ti” is a sort of gesture
to the facticity of the composite, “to that which cannot be dissolved in con-
cepts and yet for which a conceptual name is sought.”23 Indeed, the term,
itself composed of a demonstrative and an indefinite, seems to point to
the peculiar sort of ontological independence of the finite, sensible com-
posite individual. Ernst Tugendhat has emphasized the rather remarkable
way in which the term “tovde ti” gestures toward the twofold nature of the
composite, which is at once determinate and indeterminate, concrete and
yet elusive.24 Thus, although the “tovde ti” itself designates that which is
individual, it points directly to the fact that this individual is always already
encountered as composed of form and matter, two dimensions that them-
selves are neither universal nor singular, but function as the ontological
grounds of the concrete composite individual itself.
If, however, this is the case, then some account must be given of the man-
ner in which form and matter exist as a unity; that is, how they function as
ontological grounds. This problem is addressed in the second move of
Aristotle’s double strategy, namely, the translation of the concepts of form
and matter into the more dynamic notions of ejnevrgeia and duvnami~, re-
spectively. Aristotle suggests that once we understand form and matter in
this way, it is possible to show precisely how they function together as the
irreducible and equi-original grounds of the identity of the composite indi-
vidual.25 This is, in fact, the main purpose of book IX, in which Aristotle
attempts to establish the ontological meanings of duvnami~ and ejnevrgeia.
Aristotle begins book IX by rehearsing the meaning of duvnami~ as it is
most commonly used, namely, with regard to things in motion. The model
of kivnhsi~ (motion), however, turns out to be insufficient for the present
purpose of developing a conception of being whereby ejnevrgeia and
duvnami~ can be thought together. Motion cannot sustain the identity of
ejnevrgeia and duvnami~ because the principle of movement and the end
towards which the motion is directed remain outside of the motion itself.
While a house is being built, for example, the material remains potentially,
but not yet actually, a house; once it is completed, the house is actual, but
no longer potential with respect to being a house.26 Aryeh Kosman puts this
dynamic of kivnhsi~ memorably: “a motion is, so to speak, on a suicide
mission. A motion is fully realizable only posthumously; while alive, it has
not yet fully achieved its being.”27 Because of this suicidal tendency and its
inability to maintain itself in the realization of its end, motion cannot of-
fer Aristotle the model by which to think oujsiva as the active identity of
ejnevrgeia and duvnami~.
Over against the model of motion, however, Aristotle proposes an activity
he variously refers to as “ejnevrgeia,” “ejntelevceia,” and, most significantly
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for the present purposes, “pra`xi~,” that is capable of holding the tension
between ejnevrgeia and duvnami~.28 Unlike a motion, at each moment of its
existence, an activity retains its potentiality and is fully realized at the same
time—it exists for no purpose beyond this its activity; it is ejntelhv~—com-
plete in itself. Here the relationship between ejnevrgeia and duvnami~ is not
only preserved, but also functions as the very condition for the possibility of
the activity itself, for if potentiality is ultimately consumed, the activity will
altogether cease. The examples Aristotle offers of such activities are heuris-
tically helpful: While actively seeing, one does not lose the ability to see, nor
while thinking, does one lose the ability to think, but rather, the ability is
preserved in the very exercise of the activity itself.29 The ontological signifi-
cance of this conception of activity cannot be overemphasized. Here Aristotle
hits upon the sought after model according to which the identity of ejnevrgeia
and duvnami~ can be thought. Substantial being, oujsiva, is this very activity
itself—an oujsiva is what it is only so long as it actively embodies the rela-
tionship between ejnevrgeia and duvnami~.
With this, a solution is discovered for the ontological problem uncov-
ered in the face of the universal/singular and separability aporiae. Aristotle
has focused his attention on the concrete individual, the tovde ti, which,
in its most strict sense, is the composite of form and matter. In the pro-
cess, form has been reconceived; no longer understood as an universal
existing independently of the individual, form, as ejnevrgeia, has become
one of the two ontologically constitutive grounds of the individual, itself
separable from the composite only in lovgo~. The other ground, however,
is matter, which, once it is reconceived in terms of duvnami~, emerges it-
self as one of the fundamental grounds of the being of the individual; for
the individual exists as itself only so long as the relationship between form-
ejnevrgeia and matter-duvnami~ is actively maintained. Once this activity
ceases, the being itself no longer is what it was—it loses its “what-it-was-
to-be,” its to; tiv h\n ei\nai. Thus, by beginning with the concrete existence
of the composite individual, Aristotle is able to think back to the grounds
of its being, which themselves do not have any real existence independent
of their relationship with one another.
By revising the criterion of separability, focusing his attention on the
concrete individual, and reconceiving the notions of form and matter in
terms of ejnevrgeia and duvnami~ respectively, Aristotle is able to address
the ontological dimension of the separability and universal/singular apo-
riae. Although the composite requires the existence of something external
to set it on its way to being, once this initial principle has been given, the
composite is capable of taking it up into itself and making this principle
its own. Indeed, Aristotle even says that such a being is not even potentially
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what it is until it has thus taken its own principle into itself.30 Once this is
accomplished, its existence as an individual depends on its ability to ac-
tively maintain the relationship between ejnevrgeia and duvnami~, which,
as the ontological grounds of the individual, are prior to the distinction
between universality and singularity.
However, if this story is satisfactory from a purely ontological perspec-
tive, it remains highly problematic from an epistemological point of view;
for it seems to amount to a renunciation of the universal and thus of the
possibility of establishing the study of being as an ejjpisthvmh. Thus, the
question emerges as to how knowledge of sensible oujsiva is possible if it
is not something universal.31 Aristotle hints at a possible solution to this
problem in Metaphysics XIII.10, when he reconsiders the assumption that
generates the aporia itself. This assumption, inherited from Plato and So-
crates and never explicitly questioned, is that because all knowledge is
universal, if there is to be knowledge of oujsiva, its principles too must be
universal.32 Aristotle writes:
[T]he statement is on the one hand true and on the other not true.
For knowledge (ejpisthvmh), just as knowing, has two senses, of
which one is in potentiality, the other in actuality (ejnergeiva/). Po-
tential knowledge, like matter, being universal and indefinite, is of
the universal and indefinite, but actual knowledge, being definite, is
of the definite, and being a tovde ti is of the tovde ti. . . .33
Although this passage is somewhat truncated and Aristotle’s discussion of
this seemingly novel form of knowledge ends as suddenly as it appears, its
basic structure seems clear enough and its significance is vital.
Actual knowledge (ejnergeiva/) is not universal, but is always directed to
the tovde ti from which it is able, by a sort of abstraction, to construct the
universal which may apply to a plurality of like beings. The term “may” here
is important, for this sort of universality is always potential. It is ultimately
dependent on the actual encounter with the definite tovde ti. Although it
is certainly possible that with the term “tovde ti” Aristotle means to refer
to the form in distinction from matter, it is also reasonable to think that it
is deployed in the more strict sense to refer to the concrete individual com-
posite.34 And while it is true that the distinction is drawn with reference to
a duvnami~ that is “like matter,” thus suggesting that Aristotle has the meaning
of ejnevrgeia as form in mind, the key distinction in the text is the di-
chotomy between the indefinite (ajorivsto~) and that which is definite
(wJrismevnh). This leaves open the possibility that the “tovde ti” may be the
concrete composite individual whose ontological identity is itself a sort of
ejnevrgeia, or more strictly speaking, a pra`xi~. More perspicuous than
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precisely what Aristotle means to point to with the term “tovde ti,” how-
ever, is the fact that he saw a need to revise his previous understanding of
the nature of knowledge in order to accommodate his more dynamic con-
ception of sensible oujsiva.35 The fact that Aristotle’s discussion of this new
conception of knowledge ends so abruptly invites an investigation into the
possibility that there may be elsewhere in Aristotle another conception of
knowledge suitable for this more dynamic conception of the ontological
identity of sensible oujsiva.
ANOTHER KNOWLEDGE
The first hint that the Nicomachean Ethics may be a possible place to look for
this other conception of knowledge is found in Metaphysics IX.6 itself, where
the model of activity is introduced. There are three aspects of this text that
implicitly point in the direction of the Nicomachean Ethics. First, one of the
words Aristotle employs to refer to the sort of activity developed there is
“pra`xi~,” which is itself a main concern of the Ethics, and specifically of
book VI, where it is juxtaposed with poivhsi~, or production. Of course,
the mere appearance of this word does not of itself justify the appeal to the
Ethics, for Aristotle uses the word elsewhere in a sense unrelated to the
technical meaning it receives in either the Metaphysics or the Ethics.36 Sec-
ond, however, three of the five examples to which Aristotle appeals in the
Metaphysics to clarify the meaning of this sort of pra`xi~ are taken from
the practical sphere. Along with seeing and thinking which seem funda-
mentally theoretical, Aristotle lists living well (eu\ zh`n), being happy
(euvdaimonei`n) and of particular significance, being practically wise
(fronei`n).37 Finally, the third hint that the Ethics may have some bearing
on the text from Metaphysics IX.6 has to do with the nature of the distinc-
tion Aristotle attempts to establish there between kivnhsi~ and pra`xi~,
for in NE VI, the distinction between poivhsi~ and pra`xi~ is drawn along
the same lines.
In the Metaphysics as in the Ethics, pra`xi~ is distinguished from kivnhsi~
and poivhsi~ respectively because unlike either, pra`xi~ has its principles
of beginning and end in itself. Production, like motion, depends on some-
thing external for its principle—the producer and that which is produced
remain, like the mover and that which is moved, separate, and the ends to-
wards which they are directed distinct from the process by which these ends
are achieved.38 Thus, despite Aristotle’s frequent appeal to examples taken
from the region of production, poivhsi~ could no more hold together the
dynamic identity of ejnevrgeia and duvnami~ than could kivnhsi~.39 Thus,
the vocabulary and examples deployed in the text from the Metaphysics not
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only anticipate the themes and vocabulary of the Nicomachean Ethics, but the
distinction they are designed to establish is the same in both texts as well.
Obviously, these three peculiarities do not constitute incontrovertible
evidence for the rather bold thesis that the Metaphysics culminates in the
Ethics. Rather, they are traces, excesses left by the fecundity of Aristotle’s
thinking, which, if followed, invite us not only to rethink the manner in
which Aristotle’s ontology has been historically interpreted, but also to criti-
cally call into question the prejudice toward systematic completeness and
absolute ultimates with which such interpretations have historically oper-
ated. Indeed, by attending to the ethical undertones of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, a
new, but nonetheless ancient, conception of ontology begins to emerge,
one that is not obsessed with establishing the absolute order of things, but
rather, is guided by and grounded in the direct encounter with the other.
The conception of knowledge introduced in Metaphysics XIII.10 already
points in the direction of the other insofar as it is grounded in the actual
encounter with that which is definite in itself. Yet it is not until the Ethics,
when Aristotle turns his full attention to human pra`xi~ and the knowl-
edge peculiar to it, frovnhsi~, that a full picture emerges of precisely how
a knowledge grounded in such an encounter would look. To be sure, this is
not the secure notion of knowledge Western philosophy has always dreamed
of for its ontologies, for indeed, it is neither absolutely certain nor im-
mune to error. However, in an era in which the dangers endemic to
philosophy’s myopic drive toward certainty have become devastatingly per-
spicuous, this other, less totalizing, more responsive form of knowledge
emerges as genuine alternative to the epistemic model.40
ONTOLOGICAL Frovnhsi~
The sort of knowledge introduced in Metaphysics XIII.10 resonates with the
conception of frovnhsi~ developed in the Nicomachean Ethics insofar as both
are oriented toward the concrete individual. Just as the actual knowledge
(ejpisthvmh ejnergeiva/) of XIII.10 is directed toward the tovde ti, so too is
frovnhsi~ concerned with the “last extreme” (to; e[scaton), that is, the
individual (kaq’ e{kaston).41 Like actual knowledge, frovnhsi~ determines
the universal from the direct encounter with the individual.42 Thus, the direc-
tion and nature of its operation seems to be the opposite of that of traditional
ejpisthvmh; for where ejpisthvmh subsumes each individual it encounters
under necessary universal principles it always already possesses,43 frovnhsi~
remains constantly prepared to revise and rethink the universals with which
it operates, recognizing that the universal itself is determined only in the
direct encounter with the concrete individual.
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Here a deeper significance to Aristotle’s suggestion in the Metaphysics
that the universal is always potential but never actual begins to emerge; for
in frovnhsi~ the universal functions as a sort of prejudice that serves as a
condition for the possibility of experience.44 Such prejudices emerge out
of the nexus of our historical experiences and provide the context in which
our encounters with other beings happen. Only when such prejudices be-
come reified, blindly adhered to and severed from the direct encounter
with the other do they become dangerous; that is, only when universals are
understood to have an actual existence independent of the individuals them-
selves does the unhappy situation emerge whereby individuals are
determined by some pre-conception, rather than recognized in concrete
ontological encounter. Aristotle equips frovnhsi~ with two basic features
that allow it at once to minimize this sort of violent pre-judgment by which
concepts are categorically imposed upon the individual, while maximizing
the possibility of genuine ontological recognition by which concepts are
conscientiously deployed.
These features of frovnhsi~ all have to do with the peculiar sort of intu-
ition it involves. Traditionally, intuition, or nou`~, signifies the immediate
apperception of  the truth, which itself  is necessar y and eternal. In
frovnhsi~, the truth emerges in the encounter with the individual and can-
not be directly intuited beforehand. The nou`~ endemic to frovnhsi~ is
directed to that which presents itself in all its concrete contingency. Due to
this contingency, the intuition of frovnhsi~ must be supplemented by nou`~.
Such an intuition is therefore inherently mediated, discursive and delib-
erative. Further, it is closely linked with suvnesi~, which, although usually
translated simply as “intelligence,” takes on the far richer meaning of “con-
scientious apprehension” in relation to frovnhsi~.45 Thus, the sort of
intuition involved in frovnhsi~, because it is deliberative and conscien-
tious, respects the otherness of the individual even as it seeks to know this
individual for what it is on its own terms, recognizing too that knowledge
requires the deployment and thus imposition of concepts.
Thus, the intuition of frovnhsi~ must be guided by suvnesi~, “consci-
entious apprehension,” which itself is intimately related to what Aristotle
calls ejpieivkeia, equity, and suggnwvmh, fellow-feeling or forgiveness.46 For
Aristotle, ejpieivkeia names the ability to correct the law when it is univer-
sally stated but does not fairly apply to the particular situation under
consideration—equity is the ability to adapt the universal to the concrete
contingencies of the situation at hand. To link this notion of equity to the
operation of frovnhsi~ is to equip phronetic judgment with an ability to
dynamically respond to the individual qua individual and not as a mere
instance of some abstract universal. It points to the fact that the universal
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itself is determined as universal only in the act of its application.47 This
requires suggnwvmh, or forgiveness, precisely because the operation of
frovnhsi~ must deploy universals that inevitably impinge upon the unicity
of the singular, itself accessible in each case as individual—as a tovde ti.
The recognition that the individual is at once irreducibly unique and yet
always already determined by the concepts through which it is encoun-
tered enjoins the development of a conscientious conception of judgment
that links forgiveness to equity.
The sheer complexity of the basic ontological encounter with the indi-
vidual reinforces the notion that frovnhsi~ is never immediate but is always
mediated by a sort of deliberation that must consider not only past experi-
ence, but also the contingencies of the context in which the judgment is
made and the propriety of the concepts through which the individual is
encountered. Such deliberation is always rooted in the lovgo~ that makes
the encounter between beings possible and that indeed conditions their
relation towards one another.48 This deliberative dimension of phronetic
judgment recognizes that the judge as much as the being judged is deter-
mined in the act of judgment. It thus enjoins not only respect for the
irreducible singularity of the individual, but also critical reflection upon
the propriety of the principles with which it itself operates.
This self-reflective critical dimension of becomes particularly impor-
tant when frovnhsi~ is reappropriated as ontological knowledge, for once
being is no longer understood either as some reified “thing” or as an equally
static actus purus devoid of matter,49 but rather as pra`xi~, a more dynamic
and indeed flexible form of knowledge is required. Static categories and
eternal universals are incapable of capturing, once and for all, the being of
the individual as pra`xi~. Nor, indeed, ought ontological knowledge set as
its goal this sort of conceptual entrapment in which beings are forced into
categories imposed upon them from without—a goal that itself emerges
out of an understanding of being determined by the models of production
and motion. In the Metaphysics, however, Aristotle hints at something quite
different, and frovnhsi~ offers a way to think the sort of knowing proper
to this different understanding of being. As pra`xi~, being has become
inherently unstable and destabilizing, in some sense it is novel at each new
moment, and yet it is never purely anarchic, for it operates with a dynamic
order of principles that vary according to the individual and the nexus of
relations in which it is found. If there is to be some sort of knowledge of
such beings, it must, like frovnhsi~, be capable of entering into this nexus,
remaining constantly cognizant of  its own determining involvement
therein, loyal to the direct encounter with the concrete other being. For it is
here, in the dynamic relation of this actual encounter, where the truth of
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being happens. Although Aristotle never explicitly formulates it this way,
the features of deliberation, conscientious apprehension, equity and for-
giveness with which he equips frovnhsi~ in the Ethics are precisely the
necessary features of an ontological knowledge that takes seriously the
meaning of being as pra`xi~. Thus, it may be suggested that even if it was
never his intention, Aristotle has in fact already intimated how ontology is
ethics and ethics ontology.
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